Improving health worker performance: the patient-perspective from a PBF program in Rwanda by Lannes, Laurence
  
Laurence Lannes 
Improving health worker performance: the 
patient-perspective from a PBF program in 
Rwanda 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Lannes, Laurence (2015) Improving health worker performance: the patient-perspective from a 
PBF program in Rwanda. Social Science and Medicine, 138. pp. 1-11. ISSN 0277-9536  
 
DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2015.05.033  
 
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd  
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/62415/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: June 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
1 
 
Improving health worker performance: 1 
the patient-perspective from a PBF 2 
program in Rwanda 3 
Abstract 4 
The effect of performance-based financing (PBF) on patients’ perception of primary health care services 5 
in developing countries in not well documented. Data from a randomized impact evaluation in Rwanda 6 
conducted between 2006 and 2008 in 157 primary level facilities is used to explore patients’ satisfaction 7 
with clinical and non-clinical services and quantify the contribution of individual and facility 8 
characteristics to satisfaction including PBF. Improvements in productivity, availability and competences 9 
of the health workforce following the implementation of PBF have a positive effect on patients’ 10 
satisfaction with clinical services even if patients’ satisfaction is not tied to a reward. The positive effect 11 
of PBF on non-clinical dimensions of satisfaction also suggests that PBF incentivizes providers to raise 12 
patients’ satisfaction with non-clinical services if it is associated with future financial gains. It is 13 
recommended that low and middle income countries build on the experience from high income 14 
countries to better listen to patients’ voice in general and include an assessment of patients’ satisfaction 15 
in incentive mechanisms as a way to increase the benefits of the strategy.  16 
Keywords: Rwanda, patients’ satisfaction, incentives, health workforce performance, low and 17 
middle income countries 18 
  19 
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1. Introduction 20 
Over recent decades, paying healthcare providers against agreed performance targets has gained 21 
momentum in high income countries and more recently in low and middle income countries (LMIC). 22 
Financial incentives aim to provide extrinsic motivation so as to improve health workforce performance 23 
and contribute to a health system’s performance. Poor performance in health systems is a worldwide 24 
concern and greater investment in the health sector do not necessarily translate to better health 25 
outcomes (World Health Organization, 2000).  26 
Performance incentives are increasingly promoted to enhance health workforce performance. While 27 
many terms are being used for performance systems (performance-based incentives, performance-28 
based contracting, results-based financing, Pay-4-Performance) the term Performance-Based Financing 29 
(PBF) is adopted in this paper as it is commonly used in LMIC countries. PBF can be defined as “a system 30 
approach with an orientation on results defined as quantity and quality of service outputs and inclusion 31 
of vulnerable persons (…)” (Cordaid-SINA Health, 2014). 32 
PBF is increasingly adopted in LMIC although the reform approach has been criticized on several fronts. 33 
Ireland et al. (2011) highlight the lack of rigorous evidence apart from Rwanda and a bias in publishing 34 
only positive results on PBF. They claim that the strategy has important administrative costs and that it 35 
can deter equity in access to services. They also argue that PBF may crowd out intrinsic motivation and 36 
encourage gaming within the system. Nevertheless the consensus on the positive effect of the strategy 37 
is growing as new evidence becomes available. For instance in Burundi, PBF was found to improve the 38 
utilization and quality of most maternal and child health services (Bonfrer, Van de Poel, & Van 39 
Doorslaer, 2014). The potential of performance-based financing to address structural problems of health 40 
systems is more and more acknowledged. As argued by Meessen, Soucat, and Sekabaraga (2011), PBF 41 
can be a reform catalyst. PBF is now recognized as a holistic reform approach comparable to the old 42 
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paradigms of primary healthcare and the Bamako initiative. The innovative provider payment 43 
mechanism is only one dimension of PBF and that the approach is more comprehensive as it entails, 44 
among others, health facility autonomy, integrated management of funds, autonomous human resource 45 
management, more efficient management of drugs, better quality standards, strengthened governance 46 
and accountability (Fritsche, Soeters, & Meessen, 2014).  47 
As opposed to demand side interventions that incentivize the population to use health care services 48 
(such as conditional cash transfers or vouchers), this article focuses on a supply side mechanism that 49 
incentivizes healthcare providers’ to achieve quantitative and qualitative targets in the delivery of 50 
services. Such mechanisms usually rely on indicators related to providers’ practice with the quality of 51 
care traditionally being measured from a clinical viewpoint. Patients’ view on their interaction with the 52 
health system has often been overlooked in the past. Patients’ satisfaction is however a desired 53 
outcome of care and an indicator of process quality (Donabedian, 1988).  54 
Satisfaction with health services is a multidimensional phenomenon and is categorized in various ways in 55 
the literature. Patients’ satisfaction results from their perception of service quality including: 56 
interpersonal quality, which reflects the relationship between the service provider and the patient; 57 
technical quality, which relates to the outcomes achieved and the technical competence of the service 58 
provider; environment quality, which corresponds to environmental features that shape consumer 59 
service perceptions; and administrative quality, which relates to facilitating (non-health related) services 60 
for the delivery and consumption of the health service (Dagger, Sweeney, & Johnson, 2007). The 61 
evidence suggests that patients’ satisfaction is predominantly determined by the quality of medical care 62 
(including competences, infrastructure, health services, diagnostic and therapeutic procedures); 63 
information; equity in access; costs; waiting time; cleanliness; and participative approach of care 64 
(Mpinga & Chastonay, 2011). 65 
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The patient-oriented perspective of this paper is justified on three grounds. First, one cannot ignore the 66 
impact a strategy has on users’ satisfaction as it stands for a critical component of service quality 67 
evaluation. Second, patients’ satisfaction affects compliance with treatment and is therefore important 68 
from a public health perspective. Third, satisfied patients will continue using services and recommend 69 
services to others. As PBF in LMIC primarily aims to increase utilization of health services, it is critical to 70 
ascertain that poor satisfaction with services is not hampering overall utilization. PBF focuses on 71 
providers and sets clinical targets: thus, the hypothesis is that PBF will result in improved satisfaction 72 
from clinical aspects but will have no effect on satisfaction with non-clinical dimensions. This hypothesis 73 
is tested with data from a randomized control trial of the national PBF scheme in Rwanda. In this 74 
scheme targeting primary healthcare facilities, incentives were based on the quantity of outputs 75 
achieved conditional on the quality of services delivered using 14 maternal and child health output 76 
indicators and 13 quality indicators (Basinga et al., 2011). Patients’ satisfaction was not measured.   77 
This paper will also aim to verify the reform potential of PBF with a particular focus on patients’ 78 
satisfaction in quality assurance. The analysis covers satisfaction with prenatal care and with curative 79 
care for children and adults. In the subsequent sections, a brief literature review on patients’ 80 
satisfaction and PBF is presented, followed by methods, results and a discussion with policy 81 
recommendations.  82 
2. Background 83 
Performance incentives across the world were designed to address agency issues resulting from the 84 
agent (provider) having different goals and motivations than those of the principal (patient or purchaser 85 
of health services). Performance incentives aim to align the objectives of the agent with those of the 86 
principal by tying the reward to the achievement of the principals’ objectives. The downside, if PBF does 87 
not include a complete set of outputs to ensure the full health package is delivered, is that providers 88 
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may focus on rewarded services and overlook other parts of their activity. One direct implication is that 89 
providers will have no incentive to raise patients’ satisfaction if they are not rewarded for it. However, 90 
as unsatisfied patients’ may decide not to visit the facility again, providers may perceive the need to 91 
satisfy patients, even in the absence of a reward, in particular for dimensions that determine the most 92 
satisfaction and that they can influence. 93 
In HIC, patients’ satisfaction surveys are regularly used to collect their judgment on the quality of care 94 
and P4P schemes include measures of patients’ satisfaction (Peterson, Woodard, Urech, Daw, & 95 
Sookanan, 2006). This stands for a major difference with traditional LMIC health systems where 96 
patients’ perception about health services is largely ignored. In LMIC, PBF schemes have tended to 97 
adopt a narrow clinical focus with the risk that providers would focus on clinical indicators at the 98 
expense of patients’ satisfaction. More recent PBF schemes however measure patients’ satisfaction 99 
(Cordaid-SINA Health, 2014) but the results are not yet reported in the literature. This article thus takes 100 
an unusual viewpoint (the patients’ one) to assess the effect of PBF on the quality of health services.  101 
In most P4P schemes in HIC, a measure of patients’ satisfaction is used, along with process (content of 102 
care), outcome (effect of care on patients) and structure measures (facility, personnel, equipment) to 103 
calculate the financial incentive (Peterson et al., 2006). The measure generally assesses patients’ 104 
perception of the quality of care (such as information, cleanliness or privacy) (Rosenthal, Fernandopulle, 105 
Song, & Landon, 2004). However, published studies on the effect of P4P focus on a narrow definition of 106 
quality (clinical) and do not present the patients’ perspective (Campbell et al., 2007; Peterson et al., 107 
2006; Young, Meterko, & Desai, 2000).  108 
Evidence from LMIC is scant. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Soeters, Peerenboom, Mushagalusa, 109 
and Kimanuka (2011) found that patients were more satisfied with the availability of drugs, perceived 110 
quality and respect for patients in districts participating in the PBF program. Waiting time was judged 111 
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more acceptable in control districts, but the difference with PBF districts was not significant. Other 112 
evaluations of PBF schemes do not report the impact on patients’ satisfaction. Patients’ satisfaction in 113 
LMIC is studied in relation to the status of health facilities (public or private) with authors arguing that 114 
what differs between those facilities is the available financial incentive. In a comparative analysis of 115 
patients’ satisfaction with family planning services in Tanzania, Kenya and Ghana, Hutchinson, Do, and 116 
Agha (2011) found that patients were more satisfied with the process quality in private facility but found 117 
less difference on technical quality. Greater satisfaction with family planning services in private facilities 118 
was associated with process and structural factors such as reduced waiting time and less stock outs. A 119 
systematic review using 80 studies on LMIC also found that drug supply, waiting time, privacy, 120 
confidentiality, staff friendliness, communication, dignity and efforts were better in the private sector 121 
but that patient satisfaction with care did not differ between public and private providers (Berendes, 122 
Heywood, Oliver, & Garner, 2011).  123 
3. Methods 124 
Study design 125 
The empirical study relies on data from the impact evaluation of the national PBF for primary level 126 
facilities in Rwanda. It was the first randomized experiment used to rigorously assess the impact of PBF 127 
in Africa. It took advantage of the phased PBF implementation over a 23-month period between 2006 128 
and 2008. The 19 rural districts that did not implement a PBF pilot before 2006 were paired and 129 
randomly assigned to treatment (12 districts) or control groups (7 districts). The remaining 11 districts 130 
that already piloted PBF were excluded from the impact evaluation. The three urban districts of the 131 
country were not included; therefore the study focuses on rural districts only.    132 
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Data 133 
The study relies on secondary data analysis. The author was not involved in data collection but 134 
performed all data analysis. The research protocol for this study was approved by the Rwanda National 135 
Ethics Committee. Data was collected from 157 primary level facilities, including 77 treatment facilities 136 
and 80 control facilities in 2008, after two years of PBF implementation in treatment facilities. Patient 137 
exit interviews were conducted with patients visiting the health center on the day of the interview for 138 
prenatal care, child curative care and adult curative care. In the case of children, respondents were the 139 
accompanying adult. Eight to twelve patients were interviewed for each service in each facility. 140 
Information collected from the patients included: patient characteristics, provider effort and patient 141 
satisfaction with services. Patients were asked to rank their satisfaction with medical and non-medical 142 
services according to five categories: very unsatisfied, unsatisfied, no opinion, satisfied and very satisfied 143 
for a list of ten satisfaction indicators.  144 
Variables 145 
To facilitate the interpretation of results as one could not present analyses for the ten dimensions and 146 
some dimensions might measure similar patterns, an index was constructed from the various 147 
dimensions of satisfaction as already done elsewhere (Gerber & Prince, 1999; Rao, Peters, & Bandeen-148 
Roche, 2006) The traditional principal component analysis (PCA) method that creates indexes from 149 
dummy variables (Filmer & Pritchett, 2001) was not appropriate as satisfaction variables are ordinal. 150 
Using dummy indicators in PCA would have introduced fake correlations as there were more than two 151 
categories for a variable. Following Kolenikov and Angeles (2009), polychoric correlation, an alternative 152 
approach for the analysis of ordinal data using PCA, was used. It assumes that ordinal variables were 153 
obtained by categorizing normally distributed underlying variables, and that those unobserved variables 154 
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follow a bivariate normal distribution. Polychoric correlation corresponds to the maximum likelihood 155 
estimate of that correlation.  156 
The first factor structure derived from polychoric correlation resulted in only one factor having an 157 
Eigenvalue over 1 and explaining 88% of the variation. However, waiting time, time with provider and 158 
cleanliness were not well captured by the first factor as their uniqueness exceeded their contribution to 159 
factor 1 (Table 3-1 and Table 3-2). These variables were thus removed from factor 1 and factor 1 was 160 
normalized to facilitate interpretation. As further analysis showed that they could not be combined in an 161 
index, they were kept as single measures of satisfaction.  162 
Table 3-1: Output of initial factor analysis 
Factor Eigenval
ue 
 
Diff. Prop. 
(% of 
variation 
explained
) 
Cum. 
(cum
ulati
ve 
varia
tion 
expla
ined) 
1 4.28670          3.52473 0.8823 0.882 
2 0.76197 0.53421 0.1568 1.039 
3 0.22776 0.08069 0.0469 1.086 
4 0.14707 0.0455 0.0303 1.116 
5 0.10157 0.13436 0.0209 1.137 
6 -0.03279 0.03236 -0.0067 1.130 
7 -0.06515 0.08863 -0.0134 1.117 
8 -0.15378 0.04091 -0.0317 1.085 
9 -0.19469 0.02532 -0.0401 1.045 
10 -0.22001 0 -0.0453 1 
 
Table 3-2: Contribution of variables to factor 1 
Variables Factor 1 Uniqueness 
Waiting time 0.4164 0.8266 
Time w/ provider 0.5824 0.6608 
Cleanliness 0.596 0.6448 
Privacy 0.684 0.5321 
Staff attitude 0.7362 0.458 
Cost of service 0.6606 0.5636 
Cost of drug 0.6611 0.5629 
Avail. of drugs 0.6659 0.5565 
Explanation 0.6855 0.5301 
Overall service 0.7888 0.3778 
 
 163 
Four satisfaction measures were retained, including one index corresponding to satisfaction with clinical 164 
services and three measures of satisfaction corresponding to non-clinical services (Table 3-3).  165 
Table 3-3: Satisfaction measures retained for analysis 166 
Area Satisfaction measure Satisfaction indicators included in the measure 
Clinical services Clinical services index Privacy during examination, staff attitude, explanation, cost of 
drugs, cost of the service, availability of drugs, overall 
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satisfaction 
Non-clinical services Waiting time Waiting time 
Time with provider Time with provider 
Cleanliness Cleanliness 
Statistical methods  167 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) were used for the regression on the clinical satisfaction index for each 168 
sample. OLS were compared to a censored model (Tobit) assuming no negative values. Regression 169 
outcomes from OLS and Tobit were comparable revealing the robustness of OLS outputs presented in 170 
this paper. Independent variables aimed to control for facility characteristics (public or faith-based, PBF 171 
treatment or control); individual characteristics (primary education, sex when relevant, age, health 172 
insurance); and characteristics of the health service (whether the patient was given a prescription to buy 173 
drugs outside or to perform laboratory tests from another health facility). In the sample of pregnant 174 
women, controls also included the months of pregnancy and whether it was their first prenatal care 175 
visit. In the sample of children, their age was controlled for. For all models, all independent variables 176 
were included in the models based on variables’ availability and variables that proved to influence 177 
satisfaction in the literature. A review of the literature indeed revealed that sicker patients tend to be 178 
less satisfied, while older and less educated patients are more satisfied. Evidence on gender, ethnicity 179 
and socio-economic status remains unclear (Crow et al., 2002; Hall & Dornan, 1990; Hekkert, Cihangir, 180 
Kleefstra, van den Berg, & Kool, 2009; Sitzia & Wood, 1997).  181 
The ordinal measures of satisfaction with non-clinical services (waiting time, time with provider and 182 
cleanliness) were modeled with ordered probit regressions. Independent variables included facility 183 
characteristics (public of faith-based, PBF treatment or control) and individual characteristics (primary 184 
education, sex, age and health insurance). Time spent waiting in the facility was added as a control in 185 
the regression on satisfaction with waiting time. As only the sign of coefficients of ordered probit 186 
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regressions can be interpreted, marginal effects were computed. They measure the impact of change in 187 
an independent variable on the expected change in the dependent variable. 188 
Robustness checks 189 
Data drawn from the household surveys, which provide information on the utilization of health services 190 
collected from 2,145 households in the catchment areas of the 157 primary level facilities of the impact 191 
evaluation, was used to control for district level utilization of child curative care and prenatal care 192 
services. Following evidence of large regional disparities in utilization of basic health services in Rwanda, 193 
robustness checks verify whether the observed effect of PBF on satisfaction varies with a district level 194 
utilization of services.   195 
4. Results 196 
Descriptive analysis 197 
The majority of respondents were satisfied with prenatal care and curative care for children and adults. 198 
Overall satisfaction (respondent satisfied or very satisfied) with service reached 86% for adult curative 199 
care, 90% for child curative care and 95% for prenatal care. Satisfaction with the cost of drugs and 200 
services, which occurs in about 90% of cases, is probably due to the fact that most patients benefit from 201 
health insurance. Drugs delivered at the facility and medical services are thus free of charge, except for a 202 
small financial contribution. Dissatisfaction with waiting time is the largest of the three categories of 203 
care as close to half of respondents were not satisfied (Figure 1 to Figure 3).  On average, patients 204 
waited for two and half hours before seeing a healthcare provider and 20% to 25% had to wait for more 205 
than three hours (and some up to eight hours). Descriptive statistics of independent variables included 206 
in the models are presented in Annex 1. T-tests reveal overall balance between the treatment and 207 
control groups.   208 
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Figure 1: Satisfaction with curative care for adults 
 
Figure 2: Satisfaction with prenatal care  
 
Figure 3: Satisfaction with curative care for children 
 
Regression analyses 209 
Adult curative care 210 
Adults seeking care from a facility implementing PBF are more satisfied with clinical services (+2.5%), 211 
time spent with provider and cleanliness of the facility compared to patients in control facilities. PBF has 212 
no effect on satisfaction with waiting time. Health insurance is the only other determinant of 213 
satisfaction with clinical services: insured patients were 6.7% more satisfied with clinical services than 214 
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non-insured ones. This may reflect that patients’ that are more satisfied with services of the health 215 
facility are those with health insurance. Patients’ characteristics such as age, education or sex have no 216 
effect. Similarly, prescribing practices (for drugs or laboratory tests) did not influence adults’ satisfaction 217 
with clinical services (Table 4-1).  218 
Table 4-1: Satisfaction with clinical and non-clinical services for adult curative care 219 
VARIABLES Clinical services index Waiting time Time with 
provider 
Cleanliness 
  OLS OP OP OP 
Public (=1) -0.014 -0.025 0.002 -0.170** 
 (0.009) (0.064) (0.071) (0.070) 
PBF (=1) 0.025*** -0.016 0.119* 0.169** 
 (0.008) (0.061) (0.068) (0.067) 
Drug prescription (=1) -0.003    
 (0.008)    
Laboratory tests (=1) 0.024    
 (0.030)    
Has primary education (=1) 0.013 0.044 0.005 -0.013 
 (0.008) (0.065) (0.072) (0.072) 
Male (=1) -0.006 -0.180*** 0.052 -0.033 
 (0.008) (0.063) (0.070) (0.069) 
Age 0.000 0.006*** 0.002 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Has health insurance (=1) 0.067*** 0.012 0.130 0.304* 
 (0.025) (0.164) (0.180) (0.177) 
Waiting time (hours)  -0.257***   
  (0.020)   
Observations 1,088 1,324 1,326 1,314 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 220 
OLS= Ordinary Least Squares; OP = Ordered Probit 221 
Marginal effects computed in Table 4-2 show that men were 7% more likely to be unsatisfied or very 222 
unsatisfied with waiting time compared to women. A possible explanation could be that the opportunity 223 
cost of waiting is higher for men. Adults were also 7% less likely to be satisfied with an additional waiting 224 
hour and 3% less likely to be very satisfied. Age is positively associated with satisfaction with waiting 225 
time as older patients tend to be more satisfied. PBF has no effect on satisfaction with waiting time but 226 
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a positive effect on satisfaction with time spent with provider as patients were 2% more likely to be very 227 
satisfied in treatment facilities. Patients in PBF facilities were also 4% more likely to be very satisfied 228 
with cleanliness. Contrary to waiting time, patients’ characteristics did not influence satisfaction with 229 
time spent with the provider and the cleanliness of the facility (Table 4-2).  230 
Table 4-2: Satisfaction with non-clinical services related to adult curative care (marginal effects) 231 
 Very unsatisfied Unsatisfied No opinion Satisfied Very satisfied 
 Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE 
WAITING TIME          
Public = 1 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.018 0.001 0.003 -0.007 0.017 -0.003 0.008 
PBF = 1 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.017 0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.016 -0.002 0.007 
Primary education = 1 -0.003 0.004 -0.012 0.018 -0.002 0.003 0.012 0.017 0.005 0.008 
Male = 1 0.012*** 0.004 0.051*** 0.018 0.007*** 0.003 -0.049*** 0.018 -0.020*** 0.007 
Age -0.000*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.001 -0.000*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.000 
Health insurance = 1 -0.001 0.010 -0.003 0.046 -0.001 0.007 0.003 0.045 0.001 0.019 
Waiting time (hours) 0.016*** 0.002 0.072*** 0.006 0.011*** 0.002 -0.069*** 0.007 -0.030*** 0.003 
TIME WITH PROVIDER          
Public = 1 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.006 -0.000 0.006 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.014 
PBF = 1 -0.002 0.001 -0.010* 0.006 -0.009* 0.005 -0.002 0.002 0.023* 0.013 
Primary education = 1 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.006 -0.000 0.006 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.014 
Male = 1 -0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.006 -0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.002 0.010 0.014 
Age -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Health insurance = 1 -0.003 0.004 -0.012 0.019 -0.011 0.015 0.002 0.008 0.024 0.030 
CLEANLINESS          
Public = 1 0.001* 0.001 0.013** 0.005 0.014** 0.006 0.011* 0.006 -0.040** 0.017 
PBF = 1 -0.001 0.001 -0.014** 0.006 -0.015** 0.006 -0.009** 0.004 0.039** 0.015 
Primary education = 1 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.004 -0.003 0.016 
Male = 1 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.003 -0.007 0.016 
Age -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Health insurance = 1 -0.004 0.004 -0.031 0.022 -0.029 0.018 0.004 0.015 0.059** 0.029 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 232 
Prenatal care 233 
Results on satisfaction with prenatal care present some differences when compared to satisfaction 234 
levels with curative care for adults. As for adults, pregnant women seeking care from PBF facilities were 235 
more likely to be satisfied with clinical services (+1%). However, PBF also positively influenced 236 
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satisfaction with waiting time which was not the case for adults.  Finally, PBF showed no effect on 237 
satisfaction with time spent with provider and cleanliness. Satisfaction with clinical services decreased in 238 
public facilities but increased when women were asked to perform laboratory tests from another facility 239 
(+1%). Satisfaction with care also slightly rose with months of pregnancy (Table 4-3).  240 
Table 4-3: Satisfaction with clinical and non-clinical services for prenatal care 241 
 Clinical services 
index 
Waiting time Time with 
provider 
Cleanliness 
 OLS OP OP OP 
Public (=1) -0.004* -0.153** -0.170** -0.210*** 
 (0.002) (0.068) (0.080) (0.075) 
PBF (=1) 0.006** 0.199*** -0.029 0.089 
 (0.003) (0.064) (0.074) (0.070) 
Drug prescription (=1) -0.001    
 (0.002)    
Laboratory tests (=1) 0.011**    
 (0.005)    
Has primary education (=1) -0.004 -0.128** -0.174** -0.104 
 (0.003) (0.065) (0.076) (0.071) 
Age 0.000 0.005 -0.012 0.006 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Has health insurance (=1) 0.002 -0.041 0.180 -0.034 
 (0.002) (0.121) (0.141) (0.134) 
Waiting time (hours) 0.000 -0.174***   
 (0.000) (0.018)   
Months pregnant 0.001*** 0.052*** 0.019 0.023 
 (0.000) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) 
First prenatal visit (=1) 0.006    
 (0.004)    
Number of children  -0.032 0.005 -0.032 
  (0.028) (0.033) (0.031) 
Observations 683 1,197 1,196 1,192 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 242 
OLS= Ordinary Least Squares; OP = Ordered Probit 243 
Marginal effects associated with the three non-clinical dimensions of satisfaction showed that women 244 
were 3% more likely to be satisfied and 4% more likely to be very satisfied with waiting time in PBF 245 
facilities compared to the control group. Satisfaction with waiting time decreased by 4% among more 246 
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educated women and with time spent waiting (-6% per hour) but this improved with months of 247 
pregnancy. Satisfaction with time spent with providers decreases with primary education (Table 4-4).  248 
Satisfaction with waiting time, time with provider and cleanliness of the facility was consistently greater 249 
in faith-based facilities compared to public facilities, with the probability of women being very satisfied 250 
increasing from 3% to 6% in faith-based facilities (Table 4-4). As for adults, most individual 251 
characteristics did not influence satisfaction with time spent with provider and cleanliness of the facility.  252 
Table 4-4: Satisfaction with non-clinical services related to prenatal care (marginal effects) 253 
 Very unsatisfied Unsatisfied No opinion Satisfied Very satisfied 
  Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE 
WAITING TIME           
Public = 1 0.007** 0.003 0.032** 0.014 0.012** 0.006 -0.021** 0.009 -0.031** 0.014 
PBF = 1 -0.010*** 0.004 -0.043*** 0.014 -0.016*** 0.005 0.030*** 0.010 0.038*** 0.012 
Primary education = 1 0.006* 0.003 0.027* 0.014 0.010* 0.005 -0.020* 0.010 -0.024** 0.012 
Age -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Health insurance = 1 0.002 0.006 0.009 0.025 0.003 0.010 -0.006 0.016 -0.008 0.024 
Waiting time (hours) 0.009*** 0.002 0.037*** 0.004 0.014*** 0.002 -0.026*** 0.004 -0.034*** 0.004 
Months pregnant -0.003*** 0.001 -0.011*** 0.004 -0.004*** 0.002 0.008*** 0.003 0.010*** 0.004 
Number of children 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.002 -0.005 0.004 -0.006 0.005 
TIME WITH PROVIDER           
Public = 1 0.003* 0.002 0.004** 0.002 0.008** 0.004 0.029** 0.015 -0.044** 0.021 
PBF = 1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.012 -0.007 0.019 
Primary education = 1 0.003* 0.002 0.005** 0.002 0.008** 0.004 0.027** 0.012 -0.043** 0.019 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.002 
Health insurance = 1 -0.004 0.004 -0.006 0.005 -0.009 0.008 -0.023* 0.014 0.042 0.031 
Months pregnant -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006 
Number of children -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.001 0.008 
CLEANLINESS           
Public = 1 0.002* 0.001 0.011*** 0.004 0.016*** 0.006 0.030** 0.012 -0.059*** 0.022 
PBF = 1 -0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.004 -0.007 0.006 -0.011 0.009 0.024 0.019 
Primary education = 1 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.006 0.013 0.009 -0.028 0.019 
Age -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
Health insurance = 1 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.010 0.005 0.019 -0.009 0.038 
Months pregnant -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 
Number of children 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.009 0.008 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 254 
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Child curative care 255 
PBF showed to have the smallest effect on child curative care, as the strategy only influenced 256 
satisfaction with clinical services with respondents (accompanying adult) being 2% more satisfied in 257 
treatment facilities. PBF had no effect on satisfaction with waiting time, time with provider or 258 
cleanliness. As for adult curative care, satisfaction with clinical services improved by 5% among insured 259 
respondents and no other individual or service-related factor influenced satisfaction with clinical 260 
services (Table 4-5).  261 
Table 4-5: Satisfaction with clinical and non-clinical services for child curative care 262 
VARIABLES Clinical services index Waiting time Time with provider Cleanliness 
  OLS OP OP OP 
Public (=1) -0.005 0.043 -0.084 -0.189** 
 (0.010) (0.075) (0.085) (0.084) 
PBF (=1) 0.020** -0.007 -0.027 0.099 
 (0.010) (0.072) (0.080) (0.080) 
Drug prescription (=1) 0.001    
 (0.010)    
Laboratory tests (=1) 0.030    
 (0.030)    
Has primary education (=1) -0.007 -0.172** -0.018 -0.040 
 (0.010) (0.072) (0.081) (0.080) 
Male (=1) -0.005 0.000 0.039 0.001 
 (0.013) (0.126) (0.141) (0.140) 
Age 0.001 0.003 0.007 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Has health insurance (=1) 0.053** -0.291** 0.195 -0.052 
 (0.024) (0.125) (0.140) (0.139) 
Age of the child -0.006 -0.052* -0.122*** -0.038 
 (0.004) (0.028) (0.032) (0.031) 
Waiting time (hours)  -0.206***   
  (0.021)   
Observations 750 947 945 940 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 263 
OLS= Ordinary Least Squares; OP = Ordered Probit 264 
As for other groups of patients, waiting time was the satisfaction dimension most influenced by 265 
individual characteristics. Insured respondents and those with primary education were less likely to be 266 
satisfied or very satisfied with waiting time. Their satisfaction also decreased as they spent more time 267 
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waiting. Satisfaction with time spent with the provider was higher for younger children. Finally, patients 268 
were 4.5% more likely to be very satisfied with cleanliness in faith-based facilities (Table 4-6).  269 
Table 4-6: Satisfaction with non-clinical services related to child curative care (marginal effects) 270 
  Very unsatisfied Unsatisfied No opinion Satisfied Very satisfied 
  Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE 
WAITING TIME           
Public = 1 -0.003 0.005 -0.012 0.021 -0.002 0.003 0.012 0.021 0.005 0.009 
PBF = 1 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.020 0.000 0.003 -0.002 0.020 -0.001 0.008 
Primary education = 1 0.012** 0.006 0.048** 0.020 0.007** 0.003 -0.048** 0.020 -0.020** 0.008 
Male =1 -0.000 0.009 -0.000 0.035 -0.000 0.006 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.015 
Age -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Health insurance = 1 0.016*** 0.006 0.078** 0.032 0.016* 0.008 -0.069*** 0.025 -0.041* 0.021 
Age of the child 0.004* 0.002 0.014* 0.008 0.002* 0.001 -0.014* 0.008 -0.006* 0.003 
Waiting time (hours) 0.014*** 0.002 0.057*** 0.007 0.009*** 0.002 -0.056*** 0.007 -0.024*** 0.003 
TIME WITH PROVIDER           
Public = 1 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 -0.019 0.019 
PBF = 1 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.004 -0.006 0.017 
Primary education = 1 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.004 -0.004 0.018 
Male =1 -0.000 0.002 -0.003 0.012 -0.002 0.009 -0.002 0.009 0.009 0.032 
Age -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Health insurance = 1 -0.003 0.003 -0.020 0.016 -0.013 0.010 -0.003 0.005 0.039 0.025 
Age of the child 0.001* 0.001 0.011*** 0.003 0.008*** 0.002 0.006** 0.003 -0.027*** 0.007 
CLEANLINESS           
Public = 1 0.003* 0.001 0.013** 0.006 0.015** 0.007 0.015* 0.008 -0.045** 0.021 
PBF = 1 -0.001 0.001 -0.007 0.006 -0.008 0.007 -0.006 0.006 0.023 0.019 
Primary education = 1 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.005 -0.009 0.018 
Male =1 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.010 -0.000 0.011 -0.000 0.009 0.000 0.032 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 
Health insurance = 1 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.011 0.004 0.011 -0.012 0.033 
Age of the child 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.009 0.007 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 271 
 272 
Robustness check 273 
Robustness checks were run to see whether satisfaction with clinical services (index) was influenced by 274 
regional disparities in the utilization of health services. Utilization of four or more prenatal care visits 275 
and of curative care for children in the event of an illness was aggregated at the district level to create 276 
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two groups of districts (lower and upper) according to their utilization level. This grouping revealed that 277 
the overall coverage of four or more antenatal care visits was larger than that of curative care for 278 
children in the event of an illness. Higher utilization of services was observed in almost the same districts 279 
for both services (Southern and Northern part of the country) and Eastern districts consistently 280 
registered with lower utilization rates (Figure 4 and Figure 5).  281 
Figure 4: Coverage of 4 or more prenatal care visits (2 
groups) 
 
Figure 5: Curative care for children in the event of an illness 
(2 groups) 
 
 282 
The robustness checks confirm the positive effect of PBF on patients’ satisfaction with clinical services 283 
among pregnant women and children under five. They reveal however that PBF has an effect on 284 
satisfaction of pregnant women only in districts where utilization of prenatal care is the lowest (+0.5%) 285 
and an effect on satisfaction with child curative care in places where utilization is the highest (+3%) 286 
(Table 4-7).  287 
Table 4-7: Robustness check for prenatal care and child curative care distinguishing district level utilization 288 
  Clinical services index  
for prenatal care 
Clinical services index  
for child curative care 
 Lower group Upper group Lower group Upper group 
Public (=1) -0.004*** -0.006 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.016) (0.014) 
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  Clinical services index  
for prenatal care 
Clinical services index  
for child curative care 
 Lower group Upper group Lower group Upper group 
PBF (=1) 0.004*** 0.007 0.009 0.026* 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.015) (0.014) 
Drug prescription (=1) -0.001 -0.005 -0.015 0.022* 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.014) (0.013) 
Laboratory tests (=1) 0.007 0.014** 0.059 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.039) (0.027) 
Has primary education (=1) -0.001 -0.009 -0.016 0.008 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) 
Male (=1)   -0.000 -0.020 
   (0.018) (0.019) 
Age -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Has health insurance (=1) 0.001 0.003 0.047 0.070*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.037) (0.023) 
Waiting time (hours) 0.000 -0.000   
 (0.000) (0.001)   
Months pregnant 0.001*** 0.000   
 (0.000) (0.000)   
First prenatal visit (=1) 0.004*** 0.008   
 (0.001) (0.009)   
Age of the child   -0.004 -0.008 
   (0.006) (0.005) 
Observations 386 297 452 298 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  289 
Limitations 290 
This paper has its own limitations, although it is one of the first papers to explore the effect of 291 
performance incentives on patients’ satisfaction in MLIC. As the instructions given to the survey firm on 292 
the number of patients to interview in each facility were misunderstood in 2006, too few interviews 293 
were conducted on satisfaction at baseline. Thus, only 2008 (follow-up) data is used in the analysis 294 
which does not allow isolating the impact of PBF through difference-in-difference technique. Only causal 295 
relationships can be drawn. Nevertheless, the analysis benefits from the randomized design of the study 296 
and rigorous evaluation of households’ perception of the quality of care in their health facility, 297 
measured from the household surveys, showed balance at baseline between treatment and control 298 
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groups (Basinga, 2009). One can reasonably assume that satisfaction of patients exiting the same 299 
facilities was also comparable at baseline and that any difference observed at follow-up can be 300 
attributed to PBF.  301 
 302 
5. Discussion 303 
This paper adds to knowledge in at least three ways: first, it provides evidence on patients’ satisfaction 304 
with health services in rural Rwanda. Second, it provides evidence on determinants of patient 305 
satisfaction and discusses differences between HIC and LMIC that can serve as policy recommendations. 306 
Third, it confirms the PBF reform potential related to quality assurance and patients satisfaction. 307 
As observed in other countries (Bernhart, Wiadnyana, Wihardjo, & Pohan, 1999; Sitzia & Wood, 1997), 308 
patients interviewed in Rwanda reported high satisfaction levels for clinical and non-clinical services. 309 
This contrasts with the suboptimal use of basic health services in the country and suggests a response 310 
bias as patients tend to hold back negative views. Respondents show their lack of satisfaction only in the 311 
case of waiting time probably because it is the most tangible measure and can be easily quantified. PBF 312 
has a positive effect on satisfaction with clinical services, as observed in the Democratic Republic of 313 
Congo (Soeters et al., 2011), but its effect on non-clinical services varies. This contrasts with Burundi 314 
where Bonfrer, Soeters, et al. (2014) were not able to find an effect of PBF on the quality of care as 315 
reported by patients although clinical quality significantly improved. Results from Rwanda suggest two 316 
interesting patterns: first, PBF primarily influences satisfaction related to the clinical content of care: 317 
satisfaction with clinical services improved by 2.5% for adult care, 1% for prenatal care and 2% for child 318 
care in PBF facilities suggesting that productivity gains achieved through PBF did not hamper healthcare 319 
service quality as perceived by patients. This is a key finding as service quality under pay-for-320 
performance schemes is a major concern in the literature (Greene & Nash, 2009; Peterson et al., 2006). 321 
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Second, PBF can influence non-clinical dimensions of satisfaction if health care providers find an 322 
incentive to do so, that is to say if the dimension is somehow compatible with the existing incentives. 323 
For instance, with PBF, the proportion of very satisfied adults increases by 2% for time spent with 324 
provider and by 4% for cleanliness of the facility whereas those dimensions are not influenced by PBF 325 
for pregnant women and children. This may reveal that contrary to pregnant women who primarily pay 326 
attention to clinical services as they have no alternative but to visit the health facility, adults that are not 327 
satisfied with non-clinical services could have chosen self-medication and thus not visited the facility. As 328 
a consequence, health care providers have an incentive to satisfy adults with clinical but also non-clinical 329 
dimensions so that they visit the facility again and advise other people to do so, which will have a 330 
positive effect of providers’ earnings. Interestingly, PBF has no effect on waiting time except for 331 
pregnant women: pregnant women are 7% more likely to be satisfied or very satisfied with waiting time 332 
in PBF facilities. This suggests that healthcare providers have adopted a coping strategy to raise 333 
satisfaction among patients that represent the largest potential financial gain. If pregnant women are 334 
very pleased, they may visit the facility again for prenatal care (rewarded service) and institutional 335 
delivery (the service with the largest financial reward). This contradicts evidence from the Democratic 336 
Republic of Congo where PBF had a negative (but not significant) effect on waiting time (Soeters et al., 337 
2011). In the case of adults and children, dissatisfaction with waiting time can reflect the lack of human 338 
resources, space and equipment, but also poor responsiveness of healthcare providers which do not 339 
have an incentive to reduce waiting times.  340 
Satisfaction with clinical services is greater among insured patients (+7% for adults and +5% for 341 
children). Prescribing laboratory tests also influences a pregnant woman’s satisfaction as she may feel 342 
that the provider is taking good care of her. Interestingly, individual characteristics do not influence 343 
patients’ satisfaction with clinical services but only satisfaction with non-clinical services. The study finds 344 
that women, older patients and less educated patients tend to be more satisfied with non-clinical 345 
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services in Rwanda, which is in accordance with published evidence on the determinants of patients’ 346 
satisfaction (Crow et al., 2002; Hall & Dornan, 1990; Hekkert et al., 2009; Sitzia & Wood, 1997). The 347 
results also confirm evidence on satisfaction according to the status of facilities (public or private) in 348 
LMIC (Berendes et al., 2011)  as differences between public and faith-based facilities were found only for 349 
non-clinical services.  350 
Contrary to HIC, the assessment of patients’ satisfaction is not systematic in LMIC and only limited 351 
evidence exists. Further, LMIC traditional health systems are not well organized to internalize patient 352 
satisfaction. Until recently, performance-based financing schemes did not include a measure of 353 
satisfaction. As satisfaction with health services determines future utilization, attention paid to patients’ 354 
satisfaction is however critical to raise the overall utilization of basic health services in LMIC. While HIC 355 
intend to limit the number of contacts between patients and the healthcare system, some basic 356 
maternal and child health services remain underutilized in LMIC, particularly by the most vulnerable. 357 
Low utilization is a major impediment to patients’ becoming a countervailing force because the most 358 
unsatisfied patients rarely or never use the services. Results from the robustness check suggest that PBF 359 
improves satisfaction with clinical services only from a certain threshold and up to a certain level. For 360 
child curative care, where the utilization of services does not exceed one third of cases, PBF could make 361 
a difference, but only in districts where utilization is higher. For prenatal care services which are more 362 
commonly used, PBF can influence satisfaction, but only in districts with lower utilization. Contrary to 363 
high income countries where patients represent a countervailing force and can influence healthcare 364 
providers’ attitudes, patients from LMIC are not empowered to oppose to healthcare providers.  365 
Three policy recommendations can be drawn from the above analysis. First, health care managers and 366 
decision makers in LMIC should consider service quality and patients’ satisfaction as important strategic 367 
objectives. Measurement of patients’ satisfaction should be conducted alongside the traditional 368 
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monitoring of quality of care to give more weight to patients’ voice and incentivize providers to be more 369 
responsive. Patients’ satisfaction with healthcare services is particularly critical in LMIC where the 370 
population lacks trust in health services and where utilization of basic health services is low. Second, 371 
designers of PBF schemes in LMIC should integrate satisfaction measures in the incentive mechanism. 372 
LMIC should build on the experience from HIC to ensure satisfaction is a component of the quality of 373 
care evaluation in general and of performance incentives in particular. In Rwanda for instance, PBF was 374 
accompanied by strong reporting and supervision mechanisms (Basinga et al., 2011) that probably 375 
contributed to the positive effect of PBF on patients’ satisfaction with clinical services. Third, the 376 
potential of performance-based financing in addressing structural problems of health systems should be 377 
acknowledged.  As argued by Meessen et al. (2011), PBF can be a reform catalyst. The Rwanda case 378 
shows that although PBF focuses on suppliers of health care services and on the process of care, it can 379 
improve patients’ experience with health care services and improve their satisfaction with clinical and 380 
some non-clinical services. This should further encourage policy makers to explore synergies between 381 
PBF and other strategies aimed at improving fuller utilization and higher quality of health services.  382 
6. Conclusion 383 
This study provides evidence on patients’ satisfaction with primary health care services in LMIC. It 384 
contributes in filling a knowledge gap by looking at an unexplored aspect of performance-based 385 
financing , taking a patient’s perspective to see how PBF affects healthcare services.  386 
This paper supports the hypothesis that PBF succeeds in improving patients’ satisfaction levels with 387 
health services, in particular for clinical related services. Improvements in staff availability , productivity 388 
and competences can result in patients being more satisfied with both clinical and non-clinical services 389 
provided. In other words, efficiency gains are not achieved at the expense of a perceived quality of care. 390 
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In some instances, PBF can also improve satisfaction with non-clinical dimensions if they can generate 391 
future financial gains.  392 
The positive effect of PBF on patient satisfaction confirms that PBF is more than a provider payment 393 
mechanism because it can contribute in strengthening health systems. As satisfaction with services can 394 
improve healthcare utilization and health outcomes, LMIC should build on the experience of high 395 
income countries’ to respond better to the voice of patients’ and include their feedback in quality 396 
assessments. As PBF is increasingly implemented in African countries, its reform catalyst potential 397 
should further be explored.   398 
  399 
25 
 
Annex 1 400 
 Control group Treatment group Total T-test of 
difference 
in means 
 Obs. mean SE Obs. mean SE Obs. mean SE 
Adult care           
Public 675 63%         0.018  664 66%         0.018  1339 65%         0.010          0.227  
Prescription 675 50%         0.019  664 54%         0.019  1339 52%         0.013          0.143  
Laboratory test 675 4%         0.007  664 5%         0.008  1339 4%         0.005          0.553  
Has primary education 675 39%         0.018  664 35%         0.018  1339 37%         0.013          0.158  
Male 675 40%         0.018  664 37%         0.018  1339 38%         0.013          0.035  
Age 675               39          0.609  664               39          0.622  1339               39          0.435          0.935  
Has health insurance 675 95%         0.008  664 97%         0.005  1339 96%         0.005          0.007  
Prenatal care           
Public 666 64%         0.018  693 68%         0.017  1359 66%         0.013          0.107  
Drug prescription 666 6%         0.009  693 5%         0.008  1359 5%         0.006          0.594  
Laboratory tests 666 1%         0.004  693 2%         0.005  1359 1%         0.003          0.121  
Has primary education 666 43%         0.019  693 40%         0.018  1359 41%         0.013          0.222  
Age 666 28         0.248  693 28         0.231  1359 28         0.169          0.525  
Has health insurance 666 91%         0.010  693 93%         0.009  1359 92%         0.007          0.304  
Waiting time (hours) 666 2.25         0.065  693 2.43         0.072  1359 2.34         0.049          0.066  
Months pregnant 666 6.04         0.659  693 5.88         0.069  1359 5.96         0.047          0.111  
First prenatal visit 666 67%         0.018  693 67%         0.018  1359 67%         0.013          0.868  
Number of children 666 2         0.070  693 2         0.067  1359 2         0.048          0.568  
Child care           
Public 505 63%         0.021  459 69%         0.020  964 66%         0.010          0.046  
Drug prescription 505 39%         0.021  459 52%         0.023  964 45%         0.016          0.000  
Laboratory tests 505 3%         0.007  459 7%         0.012  964 5%         0.006          0.001  
Has primary education 505 44%         0.022  459 44%         0.023  964 44%         0.160          0.957  
Male 505 9%         0.125  459 10%         0.014  964 10%         0.009          0.418  
Age of respondent 505 30.2         0.334  459 30.1         0.385  964 30.1         0.253          0.842  
Has health insurance 505 88%         0.014  459 91%         0.013  964 90%         0.009          0.102  
Age of the child 505 2         0.060  459 2         0.057  964 2         0.042          0.769  
  401 
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